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Palaung State Liberation Front

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Palaung State Liberation Front
ပလောင်ပြည်နယ်လွတ်မြောက်ရေးတပ်ဦး
ChairmanTar Aik Bong
Secretary-GeneralTar Bone Kyaw
Founded12 January 1992 (12 January 1992)
HeadquartersNamhsan, Shan State, Myanmar
Armed wingTa'ang National Liberation Army
IdeologyPalaung interests
Federalism
ColorsGreen, Red, White
SloganPeace - Equality - Justice - Prosperity[1]
Party flag
Website
Official website

The Palaung State Liberation Front (Burmese: ပလောင်ပြည်နယ်လွတ်မြောက်ရေးတပ်ဦး; abbreviated PSLF) is a political organization and armed group in Myanmar. Its armed wing is the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA).[2]

History

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The PSLF has its origins in the Palaung National Front (PNF), a Ta’ang armed group that was founded in 1963.[3] In 1976, a PNF leader, Mai Kwan Tong, broke away with the support of the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and formed the Palaung State Liberation Organisation/Palaung State Liberation Army (PSLO/PSLA), which quickly upstaged the PNF.[4][5] The PSLA then waged a guerrilla war against the armed forces of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. In the late 1980s, the group was weakened by the introduction of new counter-insurgency tactics and the signing of a ceasefire agreement by the KIO 4th Brigade, its long-time ally, who became the Kachin Defence Army and stopped supplying it with weapons.[4] On 27 April 1991, the PSLA agreed to sign a ceasefire with the State Law and Order Restoration Council.[6] In reaction, several of its members based at the headquarters of the Karen National Union in Manerplaw, on the Thailand-Myanmar border, decided to reject the decision of their mother organization and on 12 January 1992 formed the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) under the leadership of Mai Tin Moung.[2][4][7] In the subsequent years, the PSLO progressively lost its influence and was eventually forced to the regime to disarm and demobilize in 2005.[2] Many dissatisfied rank-and-file members of the PSLO then joined the PSLF and were provided training by the KIA’s 3rd and 4th Brigades in Laiza.[6][4]

In October 2009, the PSLF held its 3rd congress and its leaders Tar Aik Bong and Tar Bone Kyaw announced the creation of the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) as the armed wing of the PSLF.[8] The TNLA then started operating in Ta'ang populated areas of northern Shan State and engaging in occasional clashes with the Tatmadaw. On 9 November 2012, it held an unofficial meeting with the junta's negociating body, the Union Peace-making Work Committee, but contacts were not further developed.[9] The PSLF/TNLA subsequently did not take part in peace negotiations with the central government partly because of their lack of confidence in the latter's ability to control the army's actions.[9] It was not a signatory of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in 2015 but joined the UWSA-led Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee.[10] In 2016, it joined the Northern Alliance along with the Arakan Army (AA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA).[11] In 2019, the AA, the MNDAA and the PSLF/TNLA strenghtened their military cooperation by founding the Three Brotherhood Alliance.[12]

Following the 2021 coup d'état the PSLF/NLA initially avoided conflict with junta troops and took advantage of the drop in fighting to boost its governance capacities in northern Shan State.[2] However, he group is known to have "engaged indirectly with the NUG and provided support to PDFs and anti-military forces, even if mostly covertly".[2] In December 2023, the PSLF/NLA took control of the Pa Laung Self-Administered Zone following the capture of the towns of Namhsan and Mantong as part of Operation 1027 during the current Myanmar civil war.[13][14]

Structure

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Although in theory the TNLA is supposed to simply be the defense department of the PSLF, in practice “there is little separation between the two" and "most PSLF officials are seconded from the armed wing".[2]

In 2013, the PSLF/TNLA started to organize their armed forces across Ta’ang areas in five regular battalions, plus one dedicated to headquarters-defence and special forces.[5] The number of battalions has been increased to 7 in 2013 and to 21 in 2015, divided into 3 brigades and supervised by two tactical operation commands.[8][15] In 2024, Tar Hod Plarng, TNLA’s commander-in-chief, claimed that the group had now "seven brigades and more than 30 battalions.”[3]

The PSLF/TNLA recruits primarily through a conscription policy that obliges eah household in areas under their control to provide at least one male recruit. Those with many sons often have to provide two.[2][3] The group has also been accused of enlisting child soldiers.[2][16][17]

Governance

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The PSLF/TNLA is known for their opposition to drug trade and drug use, which they see as they see it as a health disaster for the local population, conducting operations where they actively destroy poppy fields, heroin refineries and meth labs.[18][19][20][21] The TNLA claims that they arrest opium smugglers regularly and the narcotics seized are publicly burned on special occasions to deter drug trade.[22] In August 2012, a PSLF Central Committee meeting set up a 5 year plan for the eradication of drugs and in 2014 the group claimed to have been “able to destroy more than 1,000 acres of opium farms in Ta’ang regions” in two years.[7] The group regularly detains drug users and send them by to “detention centres” in order to cut them off from their addictions.[3] They also try to discourage local farmers from continuing to grow poppy by offering them crop substitution programs and interest-free micro-financing.[23]

In the areas they control, the PSLF has set up a bureaucracy of 1,500 staff, divided into thirteen departments.[2] Many of these lower-ranking administrators are members of the junta's administrative apparatus that were assimilated by the PSLF/TNLA as they took control of their villages. This administrative network comprises "a central office, five district-level offices, eighteen offices at the township level and many more at the village-tract level".[2] The PSLF/TNLA has set up their own police force since 2018 to maintain public order. The group also operates a parallel justice system with dedicated courts and prisons by recruiting civil servants and lawyers who sought refuge in their territory after defecting from the junta.[2] In June 2023, the PSLF/TNLA announced that they would establish forest reserve areas to prevent deforestation and preserving local species.[24]

In terms of education, the PSLF/TNLA has set up their own education system in partnership with local civil society groups and NUG workers, under the umbrella of the Ta’ang National Education Committee (TNEC). In 2023, the committee said it ran more than 420 schools, providing education to around 25,000 students.[2]

The PSLF/TNLA largely generates revenue through taxes on the transportation of goods and people.[5] Another important financing source of the group is the payment of fees by Chinese contractors conducting infrastructure projects in the region in exchange for ensuring their free access and safety.[4] The PSLF/TNLA has also been accused of making money from taxing the local drug market, despite its anti-drug stance.[25] Resistance on the part of certain inhabitants to pay taxes to the group have led its members to kidnap resisters and detain them until a ransom is paid.[26]

Armed conflict

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Since its creation the PSLF/TNLA has been frequently engaged in clashes with local armed militias established by the State Peace and Development Council junta, that are often involved in drug trafficking.[10]

From 2009 to 2011, more aggressive attempts by the Tatmadaw to subordinate groups in the region led to an increase in direct clashes with the TNLA, as well as with the KIA and the MNDAA.[6] Fighting between the TNLA and government troops then reached a new high in 2013 and 2014, leading to the death of 200 people and the displacement of more than 4,000 inhabitants.[27] In November 2016, Northen Alliance forces launched coordinated attacks on military targets in northern Shan State and briefly took control of a portion of the Mandalay-Muse Highway.[28] In November 2017, the TNLA attacked two Burma Army bases in Namhsan.[29]

After joining the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in October 2015, the RCSS/Shan State Army-South began expanding its operations towards the China border, thus encroaching on territories controlled by the PSLF/TNLA.[3] Hostilies between the two groups broke out in November 2015 after RCSS forces ambushed TNLA soldiers near Namkham.[30][31] The two groups engaged in regular skirmishes in the following years.[32][33] In late 2020, fighting escalated again.[2] In 2021, the TNLA, in cooperation with the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), managed to register gains against RCSS troops, forcing them to withdraw south of the Mandalay-Muse Highway before pushing them back to their strongholds near the Thailand-Myanmar border.[3][2]

Alliances

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The PSLF/TNLA has long been allied with the KIO/KIA, with whom it maintains close ties and cooperates militarily.[4] However, in recent years, the group has increasingly turned towards the SSPP, which fought alongside it against the RCSS, as well as the UWSA, which supplies it with weapons.[2] In May 2018, the PSLF/TNLA opened its first liaison office in Panghsang, the de facto capital of Wa State.[34] This turnaround has led to a deterioration in relations with the KIA, coupled with mutual accusations of mistreatment of the local populations.[28] Tensions with the SSPP over the control and administration of territories liberated from the junta have also arose in several occasions.[35]

References

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  1. ^ "မြေရှားသတ္တုလုပ်ငန်း စမ်းသပ်ရှာဖွေထုတ်လုပ်ခြင်း ကိစ္စရပ်အပေါ် အမိန့်ထုတ်ပြန်ချက်". Ta'ang Land (in Burmese). Archived from the original on 2024-05-31. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o "Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta'ang Army Expands in Myanmar's Shan State | Crisis Group". www.crisisgroup.org. 2023-09-04. Retrieved 2024-05-31.
  3. ^ a b c d e f Frontier (2022-02-04). "Rising dragon: TNLA declares 'victory' in northern Shan". Frontier Myanmar. Retrieved 2024-05-31.
  4. ^ a b c d e f Meehan, Patrick (2016). "The Continuation of War by Other Means. An Anatomy of the Palaung Ceasefire in Northern Shan State". War and peace in the borderlands of Myanmar: the Kachin ceasefire, 1994-2011. NIAS Press. pp. 364–371. ISBN 978-87-7694-188-8.
  5. ^ a b c Buscemi, Francesco (2023-01-01). "The Art Of Arms (Not) Being Governed: Means Of Violence And Shifting Territories In The Borderworlds of Myanmar". Geopolitics. 28 (1): 282–309. doi:10.1080/14650045.2021.1901083. ISSN 1465-0045.
  6. ^ a b c Buscemi, Francesco (2019). "Armed Political Orders through the Prism of Arms: Relations between Weapons and Insurgencies in Myanmar And Ukraine". Interdisciplinary Political Studies. 5 (1).
  7. ^ a b "Ta'ang (Palaung) Leader Tar Aik Bong: 'Without Proper Political Solutions, There Will Be No Lasting Peace'". Burma Link. 2014-11-11. Retrieved 2024-05-31.
  8. ^ a b Keenan, Paul (2013). By force of arms: armed ethnic groups in Burma. New Delhi: VIJ Books. ISBN 978-93-82652-21-2.
  9. ^ a b Thitiwut Boonyawongwiwat (2018). "Obstacles to Conflict Transformation in Myanmar: A Case Study of the Ta'ang National Liberation Army". Journal of Mekong Societies. 14: 118. doi:10.14456/JMS.2018.19.
  10. ^ a b Larsen, Niels (2016-03-22). "Dirty war, dirty tactics". Frontier Myanmar. Retrieved 2024-05-31.
  11. ^ "Northern Alliance Sets Sights on Next Myanmar Peace Conference". Radio Free Asia. 24 January 2017. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  12. ^ "Three Myanmar Rebel Groups Halt Offensive Pending Further Talks". The Irrawaddy. 4 September 2019.
  13. ^ "Myanmar rebels seize town from military junta despite China-backed ceasefire". France 24. 2023-12-16. Retrieved 2024-05-31.
  14. ^ "Brotherhood Alliance Seizes Another Ethnic Zone in Myanmar's northern Shan State". The Irrawaddy. 23 December 2023. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  15. ^ Keenan, Paul (2015). "All-inclusiveness in an ethnic context" (PDF). EBO Background Paper (Report).
  16. ^ "Myanmar Ethnic Armed Groups Draw Allegations of Forced Recruitment". thediplomat.com. Retrieved 2024-05-31.
  17. ^ Gupte, Prajakta (2018-06-09). "Child Soldiers in Myanmar: Role of Myanmar Government and Limitations of International Law". Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs. 6 (1). ISSN 2168-7951.
  18. ^ Larsen, Niels (2015-04-23). "On Patrol With Myanmar Rebels Fighting Both the Army and Drug Addiction". Vice. Retrieved 2024-05-31.
  19. ^ "Fire and Ice: Conflict and Drugs in Myanmar's Shan State | Crisis Group". www.crisisgroup.org. 2019-01-08. Retrieved 2024-05-31.
  20. ^ "TNLA Attacks Five Poppy-Growing Hubs in Northern Myanmar". The Irrawaddy. 16 March 2020. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  21. ^ Ferrie, Jared (5 November 2015). "The drug war in Myanmar's mountains". The New Humanitarian. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  22. ^ "Drug trade thrives in lawless post-coup Myanmar". Radio Free Asia. 27 June 2023. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  23. ^ "On the Frontline: Poverty, Opium and Militarisation in Modern Burma's Golden Triangle". Discover Society. 2014-09-02. Retrieved 2024-05-31.
  24. ^ "TNLA Designates Forest Reserve Areas". Burma News International. Retrieved 2024-05-31.
  25. ^ Weigand, Florian (2020). Conflict and transnational crime: borders, bullets & business in Southeast Asia. Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing. ISBN 978-1-78990-519-9.
  26. ^ "Myanmar Civilians Demand Protection from TNLA Kidnappings". The Irrawaddy. 21 December 2020. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  27. ^ Vrieze, Paul (8 October 2014). "Myanmar's embattled Palaung minority call for aid partners". The New Humanitarian. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  28. ^ a b Weng, Lawi (2020-09-22). "Brothers torn apart: As TNLA grows stronger, tensions rise in northern Shan". Frontier Myanmar. Retrieved 2024-05-31.
  29. ^ "TNLA Attacks Burma Army Bases in Namhsan". The Irrawaddy. 11 January 2017. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  30. ^ "RCSS-TNLA Conflict: Proxy or mini-Cold War in display?". Shan Herald Agency for News. 2016-02-23. Retrieved 2024-05-31.
  31. ^ "On the Frontline of the TNLA, SSA-S Divide". The Irrawaddy. 23 February 2016. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  32. ^ "Civilians flee as clashes between RCSS/SSA and TNLA continue". Shan Herald Agency for News. 2017-07-06. Retrieved 2024-05-31.
  33. ^ Nom, Nang Seng (2019-09-18). "RCSS, TNLA Clash in Kyaukme Township". Shan Herald Agency for News. Retrieved 2024-05-31.
  34. ^ "Ta'ang Armed Group Opens First Liaison Office in Wa Territory". The Irrawaddy. 18 May 2018. Retrieved 31 May 2024.
  35. ^ "Tensions between TNLA and SSPP Flare up Again in Shan State". Shan Herald Agency for News. 2024-05-29. Retrieved 2024-05-31.
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